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Abstract
In this paper we reply to recent comments in this Special Issue according to which subjective probability is not consid-
ered to be a concept fit for use in forensic evaluation and expert reporting. We identify the source of these criticisms
to lie in a misunderstanding of subjective probability as unconstrained subjective probability; a lack of constraint that
neither corresponds to the way in which we referred to subjective probability in our previous contributions, nor to
the way in which probability assignment is understood by current evaluative guidelines (e.g., of ENFSI). Specifically,
we explain that we understand subjective probability as a justified assertion, i.e. a conditional assessment based on
task-relevant data and information, that may be thought of as a constrained subjective probability. This leads us to
emphasise again the general conclusion that there is no gap between justified (or, reasonable) subjective probability
and other concepts of probability in terms of its ability to provide assessments that are soundly based on whatever
relevant information available. We also note that the challenges an expert faces in reporting probabilities apply equally
to all interpretations of probability, not only to subjective probability.
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1. Introduction
What started as a discussion in [35] of what, at first sight, might look like a simple question – is there an interval around10
a probability, and hence around a likelihood ratio (Bayes factor)? – grew into a broader exchange in this Science &
Justice Virtual Special Issue, involving forensic scientists, statisticians, lawyers, psychologists and cognitive scientists.12
This exchange was accompanied by a widening and interesting enrichment of the discussion, though it also gave rise
to shifts of focus and revealed some incompatible positions. This is not surprising, given the diversity of backgrounds14
from which the discussants write, the differences in the nature of their respective disciplines, and the divergent views
that occur even within some of these disciplines.16
It is of interest to consider the outcome of this discussion. In this, our latest, contribution to this exchange of views, we
seek to tease out some overall concepts and summary comments that we perceive from reading all the contributions18
published so far in this collection. We will have less to say about our original discussion topic – the understanding of
probability and the likelihood ratio as a single number – because our position follows mainly from the full subjective20
Bayesian theory, and it is also acknowledged now in recent contributions to this article collection [e.g., 29]. We
will devote more space here, in Section 2, to comments concerning personal, or subjective, probability that other22
discussants have made in this series of papers. We analyse and discuss eight points in turn.
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• Why it is important neither to confound nor to oppose the theory (of probability) with its application or percep-
tion (Section 2.1);2
• Why it is important to properly define the scope of expert probability assertions (Section 2.2);
• Why the question of the foundations of assigned probabilities is important to all interpretations of probability,4
not only to subjective probability (Section 2.3);
• Why degrees of belief are scientific and can be empirically investigated (Section 2.4);6
• Why and how any probability statement can always be reconstructed as a subjective probability (Section 2.5);
• Why the subjective interpretation of probability is a justifiable premise (Section 2.6);8
• Why existing precepts for evidential assessment are sufficient to engage the entire field of forensic science
(Section 2.7).10
• Why it is important to understand the personalistic position as part of the concept of probabilistic modelling
(Section 2.8).12
Conclusions are presented in Section 3.
2. Selected discussion points14
2.1. Why it is important neither to confound nor to oppose the theory (of probability) with its application or perception
The main theme in this article collection is that of the construction of intervals for probabilities and likelihood ratios.16
Consideration of this theme requires one to ask what probability theory says on this topic. Briefly, the answer to this
is that [e.g., 5, 11], in their most fundamental form (axiomatic definition), the three rules of probability, say nothing18
about
• intervals,20
• precision,
• application of the theory,22
• assignation of probabilities.
As well as consideration, in a strict sense, of statements of the rules of probability, we have extended our discussion24
to various conceptually feasible devices for the measurement of probability, such as urn models (to elicit indifference
points) or scoring rules [24]. In combination, these provide us with several independent routes that all lead to the26
same conclusion that probability is a single number [9, 12, 35].
This conclusion has several implications. Of course, one is free to say that one does not find these definitional28
properties of probability intuitive. However, it is important to keep in mind then that such a finding is immaterial
to the logic of the theory. In other words, finding that one’s intuitive feeling or thinking about probability does not30
conform to the properties of the theory cannot be claimed to be a problem of the theory [10]. Similarly, we do
not consider arithmetic faulty simply because we may find it hard to accept that, for example, 2 + 2 = 4.1 The32
point here is that probability (theory) does not claim to provide a description of our mindset. The theory is merely
providing a framework to help us organise our thinking in a coherent way. The essential challenge thus is to find ways34
for proceeding practically given the understanding of what the theory says and does not say. Nordgaard has clearly
recognised this difficulty: “She might be convinced that it can only be one probability (...) but it is harder for her to be36
convinced that she actually has found it.” [30, at p. 20] We conclude from the above that in order to avoid a misguided
debate – i.e., the criticism of the probability for something that it does not purport to do – we should neither confound38
nor oppose the theory (of probability) with its application or how it is perceived. The two topics are distinct, though
related, and the challenge for the forensic practitioner is find ways to apply the theory meaningfully.40
2.2. Why it is important to properly define the scope of expert probability assertions
The previous discussion point highlights the importance of properly defining the scope of an expert’s probability42
assertion. Also relevant for this is the consideration that probability, at least in its interpretation as a measure of belief,
1On this point, see also Lindley in his foreword for [13].
2
is essentially a person-related concept: probability serves as a measure of uncertainty from an individual point of2
view – but also taking account, where available, of domain-wide general knowledge accepted across different experts.
The assertions of a scientist about probability thus deal with the scientific observations within the scientist’s area of4
competence, and set aside other intricacies that the legal process may entail. We emphasise this point because of a
cautionary remark formulated by Martire et al. [28] on the expression “encapsulating all uncertainty”, introduced6
earlier in this Special Issue by Berger and Slooten [5]. Martire et al. [28] write that they “(...) question the extent to
which a likelihood ratio based on personal probabilities can realistically be expected to ‘encapsulate all uncertainty’.”8
In defence of Berger and Slooten it should be emphasized that the scope of their expression ‘all uncertainty’ relates to
the individual expert’s point of view, whereas Martire et al. [28] appear to have in mind a broader perspective. In fact,10
in [28] they write: “(...) we believe there is additional uncertainty to be considered.” The latter comment reminds one
of the fact that a scientist’s report is not the end of the matter. Note though that the comment should not be read as a12
suggestion that individual probabilities asserted by scientists for the scientific issues on which they are called to opine
are deficient.14
2.3. Why the question of the foundations of assigned probabilities is important to all interpretations of probability,
not only subjective probability16
The delicate intersection between, on the one hand, understanding of the properties of probability theory (Section 2.1)
and, on the other hand, coping with this understandings in practical proceedings is well brought to our attention by18
Martire et al. [28]. They clearly acknowledge the reality that “(...) beliefs expressed as coherent probabilities are
neither ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ (...)” [28]. But, they then go on to note that scientists “(...) sincerely stating subjective20
beliefs (...) raise problems for courts (...)” [28] in the sense that they need to know the exact worth of the probabilities
they report. The question of trust that should be placed in a probabilistic statement proffered by a scientist in a22
particular instance is an essential element of a competent review of expert evidence by both prosecution and defence.
However, we disagree on two aspects.24
The first aspect regards the suggestion that the question of warrants2 for probability assertions only affects subjective
probabilities. However, this is a legitimate issue for enquiry regardless of the way – subjective or otherwise – in which26
scientists understand their probability statements. The real issue under discussion is not subjective probability, but
probability assignments in general.28
The second aspect regards the suggestion – as we understand it from [28], but also [29], both quoting [32] – that
subjective probability is equivalent to guessing – i.e., unconstrained subjectivism. We have repeatedly argued why30
this does not reflect our position. Below, we thus restate and summarise a series of points that we have hoped to have
clarified in our earlier contributions in this collection (see, in particular, Section 2 in [12]):32
• First and foremost, we entirely concur with the critics of subjective probability that it is undesirable when
scientists use the liberal concept3 of probability in an arbitrary and speculative way, to make fanciful probability34
statements devoid of any meaningful justification. For example, blank statements such as ‘in my opinion the
probability of observing this particular configuration of minutiae, given that the fingermark has been left by36
an unknown finger, is so low that it can be considered a practical impossibility’ is clearly going above and
beyond what is scientifically justifiable. It is an assertion of a very small probability, rounded off to zero. In our38
previous contribution [12] we have thus noted that where “(...) probabilities are given in this way, this is a cause
of concern, and [that] we would agree then with Morrison and Enzinger (...) that such probabilities should not be40
held acceptable”. But, we have also noted that this should not lead us to reject subjective probability altogether
because this would deprive us from the “(...) informed and defensible usage of belief type probabilities (...)”42
[12, p. 82]. We will have more to say about this, as it relates to the notion of ‘justified (or, constrained)
subjectivism’ mentioned in title of this article.
2This term, mentioned in [28], is widely used in the context of argument analysis where it is understood as the provision of a justification as to
why a particular conclusion of an argument is supported.
3We use the expression ‘liberal concept’ here because, as mentioned in Section 2.1, the probability theory does not prescribe us how to assign a
particular probability, beyond defining the range of values that a probability may take.
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• The requirement for expert probabilities to be well supported is mentioned explicitly as a requirement in current2
guidelines. For example, in its Guidance Note 3, the ENFSI Guideline for Evaluative Reporting in Forensic
Science specifies [emphasis added by the authors]:4
“The basis for these assignments shall be documented on the case file. Relevant and appropriate
published data will be used wherever possible. If appropriate published data are not available then6
data from unpublished sources may be used. Regardless of the existence of sources (published or
not) of numerical data, personal data such as experience in similar cases and peer consultations may8
be used, provided that the forensic practitioner can justify the use of such data.” [16, at p. 15]
“Such personal probability assignment is not arbitrary or speculative, but is based on a body of10
knowledge that should be available for auditing and disclosure. The forensic practitioner should not
mislead the recipient of expert information as to the basis of the personal assignment, and the extent12
to which the assignment is supported by scientific research.” [16, at p. 16]
The guideline also clearly states that if scientists cannot meet these requirements, then they can provide no help14
in assessing probative value:
“Note that if a likelihood ratio cannot be assigned by the forensic practitioner (due to a lack of16
knowledge for example), then no appropriate evaluative assessment of the findings can be made.”
[16, at p. 15]18
• By subjective (or, personal) probability – the representation of an individual’s state of knowledge (or belief state)
about an uncertain event – we mean probabilities that have been determined with the use of transparent and20
coherent belief updating procedures using any relevant data there may be [7]. This is known in (philosophical)
literature as the constraint of conditioning: the probabilities are conditioned on relevant information (data).22
Hence, our subjectivism is not unconstrained, and liable to the criticism of guesswork, but what may be called
justified subjectivism. Our subjective probabilities are conditional probabilities and at least as data-informed as24
any other conceptualization of probability. A valuable feature of conditional probabilities is that they come with
a clear explanation of how they have been obtained. Thus they conform to the ENFSI requirements mentioned26
above. In addition, criticism of subjective probability that reduces probability to its potential to permit arbitrary
probability statements overlooks the potential of this concept to encourage scientists to adopt a disciplined28
approach and assume responsibility in the process of evidence evaluation.
• Interpreting probabilities as personal beliefs – i.e., subjective probabilities – does not mean to refute frequency30
or symmetry arguments central to other interpretations of probability. As noted by De Finetti:
“Those interpretations of the notion of probability (...) which are based on symmetry (the classical32
conception; equally likely cases), or on frequency (the statistical conception; repeated trials of a
phenomenon), provide criteria which are also accepted and applied by subjectivists (...). It is not a34
question of rejecting them, or of doing without them; the difference lies in showing explicitly how
they always need to be integrated into a subjective judgment, and how they turn out to be (more or36
less directly) applicable in particular situations.” [14, at p. 334]
Besides, there are also those cases – and there are many of them in forensic practice (see also Section 2.7 for an38
example) – in which relative frequency considerations or exchangeable events cannot be considered. Subjective
probability can cope with such cases, whereas other interpretations of probability, namely the frequentist view,40
encounter applicability problems.
In summary, thus, we insist on subjective probability being a much more elaborate and richer concept than the alleged42
arbitrariness to which its critics reduce it. In particular, justified subjectivism, as we understand it, is based on proba-
bility that is as much informed by data – and is required to be so by current guidelines in the profession – as any other44
interpretation of probability. Further, the issue of questioning the warrants for particular probability assignments, as
mentioned by Martire et al. [28], is a general one, affecting any expert probability assignment.46
2.4. Why degrees of belief are scientific and can be empirically investigated
It is not uncommon to encounter views according to which degrees of belief are not scientific. Again, such views may48
be rooted in the idea that any superficially chosen probability value could be given (i.e., guessing). We have argued
4
in Section 2.3, and previously in [12], why this is not the case. Notwithstanding that argument, recent positions in2
this Special Issue reiterate the view that the subjective interpretation of probability is incompatible with a logical and
scientific approach. Morrison, for example, writes that “The position that only a subjectivist concept of probability4
is legitimate” is “(...) counterproductive for the goal of having forensic practitioners implement, and courts not only
accept but demand, logically correct and scientifically valid evaluation of forensic evidence” [29].46
There are two challenges in this objection, logic and scientific character (scientism). The former is readily dealt
with: subjective probability complies with the rules of probability (i.e., the numbers that probabilities may take8
and how probabilities are to be combined), and hence is coherent. The latter requirement, scientism, requires more
consideration, though we can only mention the topic briefly here. One way to comply with the requirement of10
scientism is to demonstrate that an individual’s personal beliefs can actually be measured, for measurement is an
essential element of science. Literature on belief measurement goes back several decades already to writers such as12
Savage [33] who described examples of experiments that allow one to learn about the subjective probabilities held
by individuals. The basic idea of the proposed techniques for measuring degrees of belief involves a consideration of14
the bets that a person is willing to accept. We are not suggesting here that forensic practice should become a betting
exercise, a point that we have also made in our previous discussion on scoring rules for probability assessment in a16
decision-theoretic perspective [12]. We are only making the conceptual point that – in principle – personal beliefs are
not something abstract or imaginary: personal beliefs can actually be empirically investigated.18
The fact that an individual’s beliefs are accessible for empirical investigation should be of particular interest to the
(forensic) cognitive scientists and psychologists involved in this discussion.5 In this context, we find it relevant to note20
and worthy a moment of reflection that statisticians, too, have made this observation. Lindley, for example, wrote:
“My view is that the most important statistical research topic as we enter the new millennium is the22
development of sensible methods of probability assessment. This will require co-operation with numerate
experimental psychologists and much experimental work. A colleague put it neatly, though with some24
exaggeration: ‘There are no problems left in statistics except the assessment of probability’. It is curious
that the typical expert in probability knows nothing about, and has no interest in, assessment.” [26, at p.26
318]
2.5. Why and how any probability statement can always be reconstructed as a subjective probability28
All statistical conclusions are obviously conditional on stated assumptions, and this is valid also for frequentist pro-
cedures, that are not dispensed from subjective choices such as the hypotheses of interest, the statistical model and30
so on. In his latest contribution to this article collection, Morrison [29] advocates a procedure by which all subjec-
tive elements – concerning what he calls ‘pre-empirical matters’ (e.g., choice of hypotheses, selection of data) – are32
separated from the purely technical procedure designed to work out probabilities (or, probability densities) in the nu-
merator and denominator of the likelihood ratio. The result is an abstract procedure whose “(...) output (...) is reported34
as the strength of evidence statement” [29]. By adding that “(...) such procedures do not involve additional subjective
judgement” [29] the stated goal is to work towards ‘maximising objectivity’. Although this procedure is transparent36
with respect to what it is doing, the determination of the probabilities for the evaluation of the strength of evidence in
this way raises the following interesting question:38
What do such probabilities mean?6
Morrison replies only indirectly to this question by stating that the “(...) proposed solution does not require the forensic40
practitioner to adopt a subjectivist concept of probability” [29].
We caution against Morrison’s statement because it suggests that one can choose the kind of probability that one is42
using or, stated otherwise, actively decide that one’s probability has nothing to do with subjectivism. Our position is
4We have never claimed that ‘only’ subjective probability is legitimate. We have only noted that all other interpretations are less comprehensive
and encounter more limitations, mainly regarding applicability [8]. See also Section 2.6 for further discussion on this point.
5See [37] for examples on the study of expert probability assignment.
6For an insightful discussion of this question, see also [4].
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to say that the contrary is actually true. As noted in our last contribution [12], the scientist will need to decide on the2
probabilities, if any, that he will report and retain for the determination of the strength of evidence (i.e., probabilities
that make up a likelihood ratio). The reported probabilities may be derived by any legitimate procedure, including4
those advocated by Morrison. But when it comes to discuss the meaning of the probability or likelihood ratio that is
reported, the subjectivist position becomes inevitable.6
For the single number that the scientist decides to report – representing the probability assigned for an uncertain
event of interest7 – it is always possible to explain this number with respect to a standard for probability, such as8
the proportion of balls in an urn that are of a certain colour [e.g., 27]. For example, if the scientist says that their
probability for the evidence, given the prosecution’s proposition and the relevant information available, is 0.01, we10
can reconstruct this probability – conceptually – as the scientist’s personal point of indifference with respect to the
event of successfully drawing8 a red ball from an urn composed of 1 red ball and 99 white balls: the two events, the12
evidence and the selection of a red ball, are considered equally uncertain. Again, as noted in Section 2.4, there is no
suggestion in our argument that probability assignments in forensic science should be turned into a gambling exercise.14
We are only pointing out what, conceptually, a given single reported probability means; there would be no hope of
making sense out of the complexities and case-specific circumstances of real world forensic cases if we were not able16
to tell, in principle, how the nature of a reported probability is (to be) understood.
2.6. Why the subjective interpretation of probability is a justifiable premise18
In Section 2.5 we have explained why the subjective interpretation of probability is essential when it comes to explain-
ing what a particular expert probability assertion means. The interpretation of probability as an individual’s personal20
belief receives, however, ongoing challenge. Morrison notes:
“Personally, I find the arguments of Biedermann et al. to be unconvincing because those arguments are22
based on a premise which a priori I believe to be false, and they have presented no evidence which has
convinced me otherwise. The premise is that only a subjectivist concept of probability is legitimate.24
Under this premise, probability is a state of mind, not a state of nature.” [29]
Our reply to this is, first, that the choice of the subjectivist interpretation of probability does not reduce to a mere26
question of premise. In particular, our premise is not ‘only a subjectivist concept of probability is legitimate’. In
fact, the contrary is true: our starting point is to say that one is entirely free in the choice of one’s interpretation of28
probability, but one ought to be able to cope with the implications of the interpretation that one has chosen. Thus,
when we say that we choose the subjectivist interpretation of probability, we do so because all other interpretations30
we know of run into difficulties of various kinds that we want to avoid.
Within the limited scope available in this paper, consider briefly the following two alternative interpretations (see32
[8] for more detailed discussion): the frequentist interpretation and the classical definition following the works of
Pierre-Simon Laplace. In the general context of the law, it has long been understood that the frequentist interpretation34
of probability does not always work. Almost half a century ago, Kaplan noted: “Given a typical contested trial, for
instance, it is meaningless to speak of the probability of the defendant’s guilt in terms of the number of times he would36
be guilty in an infinite number of exactly similar cases (...)” [22, at p. 1066] Similarly, Lindley has noted: “There
is nothing wrong with the frequency interpretation, or chance. It has not been used in this treatment because it is38
often useless. What is the chance that the defendant is guilty?” [25, at p. 48] Frequentist probabilities, thus, are not
meaningful for consideration of the probability of legal hypotheses. However, there can be a role for their use in the40
determination of likelihood ratios. For example, frequentist ideas may be used when prior parameters in the Bayesian
calculations involved in the determination of a likelihood ratio are estimated from appropriate databases. Frequentist42
ideas may then be integrated into a subjective judgement, as noted towards the end of Section 2.3, especially with
reference to the quote of De Finetti [14, at p. 334]. In this perspective, frequentist ideas may help in the assignation
7We note that this also holds for conditional probabilities as used in a likelihood ratio.
8We insist on the point that no repetition (and hence frequentist idea) is involved in this concept. The ball is to be drawn once and once only,
with the outcome (and its probability) depending only on the proportion.
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of probabilities, but not uniquely so – only as one consideration among others. Note, however, that care is required2
because many of the controversial issues discussed through this Special Issue, and the wider forensic practice [34],
are actually problems that derive from adherence to frequentist concepts.4
The second candidate interpretation, the classical definition, is based on the assumption of ‘equally probable cases’,
a concept for which no independent definition is given. This makes this interpretation circular, which is why it is not6
pursued further.
Our second line of reply to Morrison’s skepticism is that, more generally, the judgement of probability interpretations8
is not a straightforward task because it raises the question of how to specify criteria for the judgment of the adequacy of
an interpretation of probability. The criterion of applicability is one example and we have briefly mentioned above why10
the frequentist interpretation does not always meet this requirement. But the question of how to make a transition from
probability in its uninterpreted form to subjective probability touches on the more fundamental issue of how to view12
mathematics. One relevant perspective in our context of discussion is the so-called intuitionist-constructive attitude. It
says that mathematics is a formal language with every concept, starting with the most basic concepts, having a precise14
meaning. In this perspective, subjective probability is not a function on a space of sets, as in Kolmogorov’s axioms,
but rather a price assessed for specific economic transactions depending on the truth or otherwise of the event assessed16
[e.g., 23]. This brings us back to the point that we have made earlier in Section 2.5: subjective probability satisfies an
operational definition. It is operational in the sense that it allows us to render explicit the personal views of a person,18
which are otherwise not directly observable, contemplating aspects of the real world.
In summary, we conclude that a commitment to the subjective interpretation of probability is not a deliberate choice.20
It is the result of analyzing different concepts of probability and then finding that constrained (or ‘justified’ as we call
it in this paper) subjective probability represents advantages over other interpretations that may run into applicability22
problems. Avoiding such applicability problems is important because they are one reason why probabilism in forensic
science and the law has received, and continues to receive, much criticism. Even strong challengers of probability24
concepts among legal scholars consider that subjective probability is the least problematic perspective: “None of the
conceptualizations of probability except probability as subjective degrees of belief can function at trial.” [2, at p.104]26
2.7. Why existing precepts for evidential assessment are sufficient for keeping the entire field of forensic science
engaged28
Over the past few decades, several parts of the scientific and legal literature converged in their opinions that scientific
evidence should be evaluated in a balanced, transparent, value-adding, robust and logical way [e.g., 21].9 These30
are general criteria, formulated independently from particular forms of scientific evidence and specific procedural
prescriptions that may vary across different legal systems. The idea behind these criteria is to focus on how scientists32
can be supported in their sound reasoning about scientific evidence, but recognising that the question of how evidence
should actually be presented at trial is a different issue on its own (see, e.g., Redmayne [31] on what he calls the34
‘presentation problem’). It has been gradually recognised, and agreed, that the scientist can work towards meeting the
above criteria, especially logic and balance, if his thinking is directed towards answering the questions entailed by the36
numerator and denominator of the likelihood ratio: what is the probability of the scientist’s results if one proposition
for the event of interest is true rather than if an alternative proposition is true?38
In his latest discussion paper, Morrison [29] proposes his own criteria for evidential assessment:
“In considering what would be the best approach for evaluating strength of evidence, I suggest that the40
desiderata be (1) to maximise empirically demonstrable performance; (2) to maximise objectivity in the
sense of maximising transparency and replicability, and minimising the potential for cognitive bias; and42
(3) to constrain and make overt the forensic practitioner’s subjective-judgement based decisions so that
the appropriateness of those decisions can be debated before the judge in an admissibility hearing and/or44
before the trier of fact at trial.” [29]
9These criteria are also mentioned in Guidance Note 1 of the ENFSI Guideline [16], and previously in documents issued by the Assocation of
Forensic Science Providers [3] and the Royal Statistical Society’s Working Group on Statistics and the Law [1].
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Implicit in this proposal is the assignment of a likelihood ratio, a purpose that is already covered by the above men-2
tioned existing criteria, though Morrison’s desiderata may be seen as providing a more explicit statement not only of
the goals, but also of the way in which they ought to be realised, and of the technical properties to which the resulting4
expressions of probative value should conform. Among these properties is the notion of ‘empirical demonstrable
performance’. On this notion, we make two comments.6
First, the feature of demonstrability can be seen as being part of the existing criteria, mainly robustness. In its broadest
sense, robustness is a criterion that challenges a scientist’s ability to explain the grounds for his opinion, together with8
his degree of understanding of the particular evidence type [21], asking him to convey a clear idea of the reasons that
he believes entitle him to arrive at the stated conclusions. Jackson has noted:10
“(...) the scientist is directed to challenge the available data and to use it in an expert way. If there is
limited data, this should be reflected in the evaluation of the strength of the evidence. The approach not12
only helps guard against overstating the value of evidence but also assists obtaining maximum value from
the evidence.” [21, p. 85]14
Second, the goal of empirical demonstrability is laudable and may work well in areas of forensic science, especially
Morrison’s speciality of comparative analyses of speech, where ample potential exists for conducting case-tailored16
experiments (and the production of scores) under controlled conditions. However, this does not correspond to the
starting point of many areas of forensic science. A practical example helps to illustrate this point. Consider the case18
R v George [15]. The main scientific finding in this case was a single gunshot residue particle from the internal right
pocket of the coat of Mr George, found hanging on the kitchen door of his flat, one year after killing (i.e., single shot20
to the head of the victim). The following text is a section of one of the scientific reports, given as a direct quote in the
judgment (note that FDR is short for firearm discharge residue; bold underline as in original):22
“Conclusion
The significance of the FDR findings in this case can be put into context by considering two alternative24
propositions:
Mr George is the man who shot Ms Dando26
Mr George had nothing to do with the incident.
In our opinion the probability of finding a single particle of discharge residue in Mr George’s coat pocket28
would have been the same, regardless of which of the above propositions was true.
The FDR evidence is thus inconclusive. In our opinion it provides no assistance to anyone asked to30
judge which proposition is true.” [15, par. 23]
The scientists gave here their probabilities for the finding given each of the two propositions: they said they consider32
the two probabilities to be the same, meaning that their likelihood ratio was 1. Clearly, there is no such thing here as an
empirical demonstration of their opinion, because it would not feasible. For obvious time and monetary constraints,34
one cannot reasonably set up controlled experiments of shootings and then wait, in each experiment, one year –
because this is an essential feature of the circumstances of the case at hand – to see how much FDR would be found36
in the pocket. What the experts do is ask the right questions: the probability of the finding, given each of the two
propositions of interest. The question is put to experts because they are considered more knowledgable about the38
particular trace type – here, FDR formation, transfer, persistence and background (on clothing) – than laypersons
and the court. There may be debate about whether scientists should be allowed to bring this specific knowledge of40
trace type into the process. But two points need to be kept in mind. First, if experts’ accounts are not admitted, then
there is no better person left to testify on the FDR finding. Second, if the experts’ accounts are admitted, the relevant42
questions we want them to consider are still those mentioned above, because they ensure balance, transparency and
logic. Conceptually, though experts’ specialised knowledge is incomplete, at least to some degree, on practical matters44
this incompleteness is made formally – and hence scientifically – precise by probability. Note however, that only the
subjective interpretation of probability works in this case; the frequentist interpretation would not work. Moreover,46
the paucity of the data will remain the same, whatever perspective is taken.
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As can be seen, Morrison’s desiderata would encounter applicability problems in the above example, and it would be2
detrimental to the field of FDR analysis if this impasse would be used as an argument against the field’s pursuit of
the general logical framework of evaluative precepts that we have mentioned at the beginning of this section. This4
risk is real, especially in the area of FDR analysis (see [17] for a discussion). If our intention is to keep the whole
field of forensic science on track towards the implementation of the principles of logical evaluative reasoning – which6
is dependent on asking the right questions in the first place – the general and established precepts for evidential
assessment [1, 3, 16, 21] pose a feasible and realistic level of challenge.8
With our above two comments we do not seek to advise against empiricism. Investigating the properties of likelihood
ratios is insightful and valuable, but it may be done in many ways (see also [36] in this Special Issue) and this can be10
considered, and should be encouraged, as being part of the established criterion of robustness. We also do not intend
to give a pass to ‘bad science’, we are only arguing that there are branches of forensic science, and cases with peculiar12
circumstances (especially not replicable events), where the robustness and the foundations of scientists’ evaluations
require other forms of probing than what Morrison’s desiderata suggest, though posing possibly higher challenges to14
both scientists and cross-examiners.
16
2.8. Why it is important to understand the personalistic position as part of the concept of probabilistic modelling
For the most part in this paper we have focused on the nature and inevitability of probability to be understood as a18
personal assessment. In many instances, probabilities are assigned through a formal model, involving one or more
parameters for which, too, the scientist needs to specify probability distributions. So again, we see that the scientist20
has an active role in the process of probabilistic modelling. In our previous papers in this Special Issue we have not
addressed, for example, the particular aspect of elicitating prior distributions for parameters. Morrison [29] approaches22
this topic in his last contribution. Clearly, any statistical procedure is characterized by subjective elements, such as
the choice of hypotheses, model assumptions, and also the choice of prior distributions for model parameters. It24
is well understood that, given available data, hypotheses and model assumptions, a change in a prior distribution
may lead to appreciable changes in the output, which may be the value of a likelihood ratio or the distribution of a26
parameter of interest. This is an important topic known as sensitivity analysis, however, it was not our main focus
of attention. Morrison’s latest proposal goes into the direction of ‘objectifying’ a Bayesian solution with the aim of28
avoiding informative prior distributions as they may be felt too arbitrary and hence not useful (or justifiable) in a legal
setting. This touches on yet another topic we did not pursue, the aversion to priors. This topic is dealt with extensively30
elsewhere in existing literature (see, for example, Bernardo [6] and related literature for a discussion about reference
analysis). We underline, however, that subjectivism is unavoidable once we embrace the Bayesian paradigm that is32
characterized by an interpretation of probability as a rational, conditional measure of uncertainty. Each element in
a Bayesian analysis, including prior information, has a well-defined role and trying to eliminate any element would34
mean to misconceive what the theory is actually trying to achieve. As noted by Howson [20]: “(...) to deliberately
suppress it [prior information] in a theory which gives it an explicit role is perverse (....)” [p. 56].36
3. Conclusions
We have come to a strange point in this discussion. One the one hand, all discussants accept that probability is the38
appropriate scientific way to quantify incomplete knowledge or uncertainty. On the other hand, there are fundamental
disagreements about how a forensic expert’s assertion of probability may be understood. These disagreements do not40
help to strengthen the perception of the trustworthiness of forensic science. They do not help either to further the roles
of science [19] and probability [8] in forensic practice. Yet we see room for a reconciling perspective: the perspective42
is that all discussants pursue the idea that we should make the best use of relevant data. Differences arise only over
the question of how exactly this ought to be done:44
• Proponents favouring a strong empiricist or frequentist perspective use data exclusively to define probability
– with the consequence of not being able to give a probability in situations that cannot meaningfully be re-46
constructed in an experimental way. In short this position says, no probability – or, ‘I don’t know what the
probability is’ – without data.
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• This is different for supporters of subjective probabilism whose probability can always be given (including for2
single, not repeatable events), for it would not make sense for them to say that they do not know their own
mind, nor that they do not know what their probability is. Subjective probability is as much informed by data4
as other types of probability, but it is not defined by that data. The data only informs, or conditions, an expert’s
probability.6
Considering the challenges posed on a practical and operational account, the issue of warrant is particularly noteworthy
[28]. As we have argued, however, warrants for probability assertions do not concern only subjective probability, but8
all types of probabilities conveyed by scientists. Thus, recipients of expert information should always probe the
foundations of any probabilities asserted by scientists.10
A further conclusion that may be drawn is the need to be precise regarding the terminology and definition of con-
cepts. For example, many standard criticisms levelled against subjectivism invoke the notion of guesswork: given the12
fact that subjective probabilities purport to represent an individual’s personal beliefs which, by definition, can take
any value, it is argued that subjective probabilities run the risk of being aleatory, fanciful, speculative or otherwise14
unsound. However, the discussion is not about so-called unconstrained subjective probabilities; that would indeed be
discomforting. As noted above, the concept we have in mind is of constrained subjective probability. Probabilities of16
this type, conditioned on task-relevant data, are also required by current evaluative guidelines [16].
A generally skeptical position is taken by Morrison [29] who contends that “[i]nsisting on a subjectivist concept18
of probability is counterproductive” and would go against a “logically correct and scientifically valid evaluation of
forensic evidence”. Our reply (Section 2.4) to this is that, first, subjective probabilities are, of course, logical (i.e.,20
in agreement with the rules of probability calculus) and scientific (i.e., measurable). Second, subjective probability
is not a question of insistence, but of inevitability (Section 2.5), and it would be unscientific actively to ignore this22
reality.
While no-one is able to tell scientists what their subjective probabilities ought to be, clarification can be given as to the24
consequences of their choices. Ultimately, the probability that a scientist will retain in his reporting – in whatever way
it was worked out and its nature is understood – can be seen as a decision [9, 12], highlighting the idea that the reported26
probability represents the answer judged most appropriate – conditioned on all task-relevant information, domain
knowledge and background data – that the scientist can give in reply to the uncertainty to be assessed. Understanding28
expert probability reporting as a decision to be made by the scientist has the additional advantage of encouraging
scientists to make up their minds seriously, and assume responsibility for the assignments they will convey. As in30
probability theory, we cannot require all discussants to share the same probability in actual tasks requiring probability
assignments, though it appears fair to require all discussants to have reasonable (i.e., justified) probabilities [18].32
Broad agreement on this is demonstrated in this Special Issue by the fact that there is ample exchange on probability
assignment, which also demonstrates that discussants take this task seriously and actually want their probabilities to34
be well supported.
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